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Abstract
In New Trade Theory models, the larger region hosts an overproportionate share of
producers. This Home Market Effect (HME) exacerbates regional income discrepancies
caused by trade frictions or technology differences. With homogeneous firms, it requires
inter-industry reallocations to emerge. We present a heterogeneous firms single-sector
model with fixed market access costs, in which the HME arises exclusively from empir-
ically more relevant intra-industry reallocations. It is magnified by lower trade costs or
higher heterogeneity. In contrast to multi-industry models, a more pronounced HME
leads to regional income convergence as adjustment of the firm size distribution coun-
teracts the effects of firm entry.
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1 Motivation
Multi-industry New Trade Theory models predict that lower trade frictions invite firms to
more strongly cluster in the larger market, exacerbating the natural advantages conferred by
market size (Helpman and Krugman, 1985).1 This result builds on reallocation of resources
between industries. The larger region increasingly specializes on the increasing-returns sec-
tor while the smaller region specializes more strongly on the homogeneous outside good.
Central to this argument is the so-called Home Market Effect (HME), by which the bigger
economy hosts a more than proportionate share of producers, and the Home Market Mag-
nification Effect (HMME), by which the HME is magnified when trade costs fall.2 Both HME
and HMME are important building blocks of economic geography models.
However, a large body of empirical literature shows that lower trade costs mostly induce
resource reallocation within industries, not between them.3 This evidence begs the ques-
tion as to whether a HME can arise from intra-industry reallocations alone, and how, if it
exists, the HME interacts with trade costs in shaping regional per capita income discrepan-
cies. To provide an answer, we work with an asymmetric Melitz (2003) single-sector model
where monopolistically competitive producers differ with respect to productivity and there
are fixed costs of market access. We show that intra-industry reallocation generates a HME
in complete absence of cross-sector effects. The HME arises because market size differences
affect the firm size distribution within a single sector. When reallocations are exclusively
intra-industry, lower trade costs do not lead to divergence of real incomes across regions but
to convergence. More pronounced productivity dispersion enforces this process.
1E.g., a larger fraction of consumed goods is subject to trade costs, and, so, the price index tends to be lower.
2The presence of a HME is a distinctive characteristic of models, where monopolistic firms produce variants
of a differentiated goods under increasing returns to scale and where the number of firms adjusts due to free
entry; when the number of goods is fixed, the larger region suffers a disadvantage due its lower terms of trade.
3Empirical evidence on developing countries includes Haltiwanger, Kugler, Kugler, Micco, and Pages (2004),
who “observe that, for the whole sample and for each country, most of sector reallocation is within sector” (p. 200)
and Wacziarg and Wallack (2004), who find that “trade liberalization has far smaller effects on intersectoral labor
shifts than is often presumed” (p. 413). In a linked employer-employee data set on Brazilian firms, Menezes-
Filho and Muendler (2011) report that “worker flows within sectors are consistent with the idea that reallocations
between employers in an industry are dominant” (p. 12).
Similar results hold for developed countries. Using U.S. data, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) show “that
these aggregate [productivity] gains [from trade liberalization] are driven by a reallocation of activity toward more
productive plants within industries” (p. 934).
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We develop a new graphical device based on a market crowding curve and a market po-
tential curve. The tool allows for easy comparative statics despite country-level heterogeneity
in endowments and technology. In particular, the much debated but often introduced linear
outside sector, which leads to factor price insensitivity, can be easily dispensed with. We find
that both the HME and regional income inequality can be characterized by a single endoge-
nous variable, the relative probability of successful innovation´.
As in the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model, a region commanding a larger share of
world population is a more attractive business location. However, in our model, there are two
margins on which higher demand for labor is accommodated: first, the relative wage of the
region goes up; second, the average size of firms goes down. The presence of a linear outside
sector would mute the first channel, thereby exaggerating the size of the HME. If firms are
homogeneous, firm size cannot adjust, and the wage rises until the number of active firms is
exactly proportional to the labor force.4
Importantly, the upward adjustment in wages entailed by the crowding of firms in the
larger region, does not fully offset the advantages of increased market potential. Home mar-
ket size is particularly relevant for domestic firms whose competitive cost disadvantage rel-
ative to foreign firms is attenuated by trade costs. Importantly, while the mass of firms at-
tempting entry is strictly proportional to the endowment size, the likelihood of a given firm
to successfully cover its fixed costs is greater in the larger market.
Firm-level heterogeneity, selection into markets, and regional asymmetries are crucial for
the emergence of a single-sector HME. Without asymmetries in regional size, intra-industry
reallocations are the same in all regions, leaving no room for a HME. If there is no selection
into the domestic market, the mass of firms active in a region is not affected by trade, which
again does not induce a HME. In the absence of fixed exporting costs, trade does not trig-
ger reallocation across firms. Fixed export costs alone, however, do not suffice (Venables,
1994; Medin, 2003). In contrast, the single-sector HME and income convergence rely on the
fact that some firms do not export. Their share is endogenous and positively related to the
relative size of regions. When sorting becomes more pronounced due to a larger degree of
4So, there is no HME when firms are homogeneous, as in the single-sector Krugman (1980) model.
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productivity dispersion, or lower trade costs, the HME becomes stronger.
In a single-sector model with inelastic labor supply, variety cannot be increased without
lowering aggregate productivity. This trade off does not arise in models with elastic labor
labor. For instance, in the Helpman-Krugman (1985) framework, labor is drawn from a linear
outside sector, which allows for increasing variety without reducing labor demand per firm.
As a consequence, magnification of the HME through lower trade costs or higher productivity
dispersion is coupled with convergence of real per capita income.
Our work is related to at least four important strands of literature. First, following Krug-
man (1980), much work has examined the generality of the HME prediction. The HME ap-
pears robust to assuming a non-CES demand structure (Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005),
oligopolistic rather than monopolistic market structure (Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose, 2001),
many differentiated industries (Hanson and Xiang, 2004), more than two regions (Behrens,
Lamorgese, Ottaviano, and Tabuchi, 2009), or firm-level heterogeneity (Demidova, 2008; Okubo
et al., 2010).5 In contrast, the assumption of a linear outside sector and the implied factor
price insensitivity have been much debated. If the wage does adjust, the HME can disap-
pear (Head and Mayer, 2004). Similarly, trade costs in the outside sector can make the HME
go away, too (Davis, 1998). Crozet and Trionfetti (2008) have qualified this prediction. They
introduce Armington differentiation and trade costs into the outside sector, nesting Help-
man and Krugman (1985) and Davis (1998). Their numerical results suggest that the HME
survives but becomes non-linear. All those papers rely on some form of inter-industry real-
location. We seem to be the first to study in full analytical detail how a HME can arise from
intra-industry reallocation and how it relates to regional per capita income inequality.
Second, due to its prevalence in models of increasing returns to scale, the HME has been
used as a discriminating criterion to test for the validity of New Trade Theory in empirical
work (Davis and Weinstein, 1999, 2003). A number of prominent empirical papers are Feen-
stra et al., (2001), Head and Ries (2001), Davis and Weinstein (2003), and Hanson and Xiang
(2004). In their survey, Head and Mayer (2004) conclude that “The evidence on HMEs accumu-
5Also, as shown by Helpman and Krugman (1985), one can have more than one factor of production if the
production technology is homothetic.
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lated in those papers is highly mixed”. More recent research finds stronger results in favor of
the HME; see Crozet and Trionfetti (2008) or Brülhart and Trionfetti (2009). The existence of a
single-sector HME is important for empirical work. Against the background of the Helpman
and Krugman (1985) model, rejection of the HME prediction could be interpreted as failure
of the linear outside sector assumption or, more broadly, of the relevance of inter-industry
resource reallocation. Moreover, we show that empirical work based on industry-data should
control for technology levels and for the degree of productivity heterogeneity.6
Third, the HME is core to New Economic Geography (NEG) models, where regional per
capita inequality results from from market crowding and market potential effects and their
interaction with regional factor mobility, see, e.g., Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999) or
Head and Mayer (2004) for surveys. Inter-industry reallocation is crucial in the typical NEG
models. We abstract from factor mobility but allow for interregional technology differences.
Similar to NEG, our analysis is motivated by the strong evidence on the role of market size
for regional per capita incomes, see Redding and Venables (2004) for cross-country evidence
and Hanson (2005) for evidence on U.S. regions.
Finally, we relate to the growing literature on the asymmetric Melitz model. So far, most
papers have used the outside sector simplification.7 Recently, Demidova and Rodríguez-
Clare (2011) use a small economy Melitz (2003) model to show that eliminating the assump-
tion of an outside sector reverses the result in Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) or Demidova
(2008), where a region that unilaterally lowers trade costs experiences a decline in welfare.8
Their framework bears resemblance to ours; however, we analyze the case of two large economies.
Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) discuss a general class of models encompass-
ing the Melitz framework for asymmetric countries or regions. Their ambition is not to fully
characterize endogenous variables in terms of exogenous ones, but to demonstrate the valid-
ity of a simple welfare function that is isomorphic across different models with and without
firm-level heterogeneity. They argue that heterogeneity and selection matter less for aggre-
6To make this claim, we alternatively define a HME in demand shares, as is customary in the empirical litera-
ture.
7Prominent examples are Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006), Baldwin
and Forslid (2010), and Ossa (2011).
8Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) use this framework to analyze trade policy.
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gate welfare than what has been hitherto believed. In contrast, for our result, without both
heterogeneity and selection the HME disappears. Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) em-
bed intra-industry reallocation in a Heckscher-Ohlin model of comparative advantage. Their
focus is on comparisons across sectors and factors, while we are interested in regional per
capite income inequality. They do not discuss the effect of changes in productivity disper-
sion; we do. Their analytical results refer to the transition from autarky to free trade; we
present analytical results for gradual trade liberalization.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sec-
tion 3 proves the existence of the HME and shows that lower trade costs or higher productivity
dispersion magnifies the HME and leads to per capita income convergence. Section 4 pro-
vides a quantitative illustration. Section 5 discusses several extensions. Section 6 concludes.
Details to the derivations are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic environment
The model extends Melitz (2003) to the case of two large asymmetric regions, indexed by
i ∈ {H,F}. Each region is populated by Li identical households. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the distribution of world endowments is such that λ ≡ LH/ (LH + LF ) ≥
1/2. Labor is the only factor of production. Each household inelastically supplies one unit of
labor.9 We will denote wages by wi. The representative consumer has standard Dixit-Stiglitz










9In the standard Krugman (1980) framework, Fujita et al. (1999) consider a two-sector model with flexible
elasticity of labor supply to the differentiated good sector. With perfectly elastic labor supply, the HME always
appears, but if we approach the perfectly inelastic labor supply case, the HME will be reversed for some level of
trade costs; see Head and Mayer (2004), p. 29f.
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where the measure of the set Ωi is the mass of available varieties, qi [z] is the quantity of variety
z consumed, and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution.
Firms compete monopolistically in a single sector. After paying fixed innovation costs
wif
e, they obtain information about their productivity level ϕwhich is sampled from a Pareto
distribution whose c.d.f. is given by Gi [ϕ] = 1 − (bi/ϕ)
β . The shape parameter β is inversely
related to productivity dispersion and fixed in both regions.10 The minimum admissibly pro-
ductivity level bi potentially differs across regions. Without loss of generality, we assume
B ≡ bH/bF ≥ 1.
11 Output is linear in ϕ.12 A firm in region i pays fixed market access costs
wifij to serve consumers in region j. Selection implies that a firm does not necessarily serve
both markets. For simplicity, we assume fij = fji = f
x and fii = fjj = f
d. As usual, exporting
involves symmetric iceberg trade costs τ ij = τ ji = τ ≥ 1, where τ ii = 1. Then, τ ijwi/ϕ is the
marginal cost of producing one unit of output in i and selling to j.
2.2 Equilibrium conditions
The first set of equilibrium conditions are zero cutoff profit conditions.13 They pin down the
minimum productivity level ϕ∗ij required for a firm in region i to make at least zero profits by








= wifij , i ∈ {H,F} , j ∈ {H,F} , (2)
where ρ = (σ − 1)/σ ∈ (0, 1) is the inverse of the mark-up. Since we assume balanced trade,
aggregate expenditure Rj is equal to national income wjLj . The left hand side of equation
(2) denotes profits of a firm with labor productivity ϕ∗ij . They are proportional to aggregate
10The Pareto distribution is a standard assumption in the literature, see, e.g., Helpman et al. (2004), Falvey et
al. (2006), Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), and many others. In extensions we show that our core results hold
under a general productivity distribution.
11B is the relative productivity bound. Given symmetry in the shape parameter, B > 1 implies that the ex
ante productivity distribution in Home stochastically dominates the productivity distribution in Foreign. B is
therefore a measure of the technology gap.
12Note that each variety z is produced by a single firm with productivity level ϕ. We henceforth index varieties
by ϕ.
13The equilibrium conditions are derived in detail in section A.1 of the Appendix. See also Arkolakis, Demidova,
Klenow, and Rodríguez-Clare (2008).
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profitsRj/σ. Firm-level profits increase in the price level Pj as the firm’s competitive position
there is improved; they decrease in wi for the opposite reason. The right hand side denotes
the value of fixed market entry costs. The price index is given by














/pini is the fraction of firms which serve market j, and θ ≡ β/ (β − (σ − 1)) is
a strictly positive constant.14
Note that pini ∈ (0, 1) denotes the probability of successful innovation.
15 Empirical evi-
dence suggests that only the most productive firms export. The model reproduces this styl-
ized fact if parameters are such that ϕ∗ij > ϕ
∗
ii. Then,
pini = 1−G [ϕ
∗
ii] .
We refer to this situation as to the case of conventional sorting. Unconventional sorting
obtains if Home becomes very large relative to Foreign. For given fixed costs, the sorting
condition can reverse: then, only the more productive foreign firms serve the small foreign
market, so pinF = 1 − G [ϕ
∗
FH ] . In line with the evidence, for the main part of the paper
we assume that conventional sorting holds.16 This happens in equilibrium, if Home’s share
in the world labor endowment is not too big, i.e., if λ < λ̄ ≡ λ
[







∈ (0, 1) is a measure of the freeness of trade.17
The second set of equilibrium conditions are free entry conditions. In each region, firms
invest fixed setup costs until expected profits from entering (θ − 1)wi
∑
j mijfij are equal to
innovation costs discounted by the probability of successful innovation pini . The two free
14This is to ensure that the variance of the size distribution is finite.
15Innovation is successful if a firm in country i draws a productivity ϕ which allows to make non-negative
profits on at least one market.
16We relax this assumption in Section 5.1.
17The function λ
[
B, η, β, ρ; fx/fd
]
is characterized in Appendix A.2.4. A sufficient condition for η < 1 is fx >
fd.
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Note that wages have dropped out from this condition.
Finally, there are two labor market clearing conditions. With the above equilibrium con-






, i ∈ {H,F} , (5)
where the mass of active producers in region i,Mi, is linked to labor supply Li and the likeli-
hood of successful entry pini .
18
Summarizing, we have four zero cutoff profit conditions (2), two free entry conditions (4),
and two labor market clearing conditions (5) to pin down eight unknown endogenous vari-






FH ;MH ,MF ;wH , wF } . Knowledge of these equilibrium
objects allows determining pini and mij . In the following, we use labor in Foreign as the nu-
meraire and denote wH/wF ≡ ω as the relative wage.
2.3 Intra-industry reallocation
Notice that the labor market clearing condition (5) implies a positive link between the mass
of firms and endowments. In the closed economy, the probability of successful entry does
not depend on size, and there is a one-to-one relationship between the mass of firms and
endowments. It is well-known that opening up to trade induces reallocation of resources to
more productive firms. When the average firm is more productive, it charges a lower price and
employs more resources. As labor supply is inelastic, the mass of active firms must decline.
We show that these reallocation effects are asymmetric if regions differ in size or technology,
which has interesting implications for the spatial selection of firms.
Notice that export fixed costs are crucial for this result. In their absence, the probability




of successful innovation is independent of region size, which results in a one-to-one relation-
ship.19 Interestingly, intra-industry reallocation is inactive in the presence of a linear outside






, i ∈ {H,F} ,
where ξi is the endogenous share of labor devoted to the differentiated good sector and p
in
i
is independent of region size.20 So, with the outside sector, the overproportional relationship
between Mi and Li results exclusively through inter-industry reallocation: the larger region
devotes a larger share of labor to the differentiated good sector, and the HME is completely
independent from heterogeneity and export selection.
3 The single-sector Home Market Effect and regional inequality
In this section we develop a simple graphical tool to discuss the emergence of a HME in our
asymmetric two-region framework, and to conduct comparative statics with respect to trade
costs or the firm-level productivity dispersion parameter.
3.1 Endowment and technology differences
We characterize the equilibrium of the asymmetric Melitz model with the help of two separate
equilibrium conditions in a diagram with the relative wage ω on the x-axis and the relative







on the y-axis. Notice that this
probability is inversely related to the relative competitiveness of Home’s domestically active
firms. χ will turn out to be the key variable driving regional inequality.
Lemma 1 In a two-region single-sector Melitz (2003) model with Pareto distributed produc-
tivities and λ ≥ 1/2 and B ≥ 1, the equilibrium exhibits conventional sorting if λ < λ̄ ≡
19Appendix E shows that in the absence of export selection, the probability of successful innovation is inde-
pendent of relative country size. This result generalizes Melitz’ (2003) remark on the role of export fixed costs for
intra-industry reallocations to asymmetric countries; see his footnote 24.




B, η, β, ρ; fx/fd
]
. There always exists a unique equilibrium at the intersection between a


















ρ ∈ (0, 1). (7)
Proof. In the Appendix.
Lemma 2 The region with the larger labor force or the leading technology pays the higher wage
and has the higher probability of successful innovation.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1.
Market crowding curve. Under the assumption of conventional sorting, the market crowd-
ing condition curve (6) is obtained by combining all four zero cutoff profit conditions (2)
and the balanced trade condition. While balanced trade is implicitly given by representative
agents in both regions being on their respective budget constraints, we now make it explicit.
Balanced trade can be written as MH r̄HF = MF r̄FH , where Mj r̄ji denotes aggregate sales of
firms located in region j in market i. One can show that r̄ij = σθwimijfij . Using the defini-
tion of mij along with equation (5), the relative wage ω appears as a function of region size










The MCC is downward-sloping and convex. At ω = Bρ, we have χ = λ (1− λ)−1Bρ. Figure 1
illustrates the locus. We refer to it as the market crowding curve (MCC): if ω increases, Home’s
relative labor costs go up and it becomes a less attractive location for production. In turn,
the domestic entry cutoff ϕ∗HH relative to ϕ
∗
FF has to go up. So, the likelihood of successful
10
innovation falls. The MCC curve illustrates a dispersion force, i.e., a negative equilibrium
correlation between relative costs and locational advantage.21














Market potential curve. Equation (7) constitutes a second relationship between the relative
probability of successful innovation χ and the relative wage ω. The derivation starts from the
free entry conditions (4). It employs equations (2) to eliminate productivity cutoffs and makes
use of balanced trade (8). The curve is strictly upward-sloping. It features an asymptote at
ω = Bρη
− ρ
β > 1 and goes through the point (Bρ, 1) . The MPC is convex if η > ρ/ (2β + ρ) ; a
sufficient condition for this is η > 1/3.22 Figure 1 illustrates the locus. We refer to this schedule
as to the market potential curve (MPC): if ω increases, Home’s relative income goes up so that
Home’s market potential increases. This makes entry of firms more attractive, the domestic
entry cutoffϕ∗HH relative toϕ
∗
FF has to fall. So, the likelihood of successful innovation goes up.
The MPC illustrates an agglomeration force, i.e., a positive equilibrium correlation between
21The MCC takes an ex post perspective in that it summarizes firm behavior after the resolution of uncertainty
about productivity.
22The analysis of Section 4 implies that this requirement is likely to be met in all reasonable circumstances.
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relative market potential and locational advantage.23
Wage inequality. Figure 1 shows that when regions are asymmetric in size, we have ω >
1. The intuition for this result is simple: at given factor costs, firms find it more profitable
to produce in the larger market as this minimizes payments of variable trade and market
access costs. To keep labor employed in both regions, this advantage must be offset by a
wage differential.24 A similar logic applies when regions differ in terms of technology. At
given factor costs, firms would prefer to produce in the market with the better technology as
this reduces marginal costs. Again, full employment requires that this advantage is offset by
a wage differential.
Reallocation effects. While the wage result is well-known from the single-sector Krugman
(1980) framework, the model with heterogeneous firms and export selection features a sec-
ond channel through which the model adjusts to regional size or technology differences: the
richer region exhibits a higher probability of successful innovation, χ > 1. Put differently,
domestic firms in the large region are less competitive compared to their counterparts in the
small region. The intuition is that the reallocation effect is stronger in the small or techno-
logically backward region, which is more open to trade. Presence in the large region is partic-
ularly valuable for firms with intermediate productivity levels. Since they do not export, the
higher wage in Home puts them at a competitive disadvantage in Home but not in Foreign.
The adjustment of entry margins makes it possible for the large economy to host firms with
lower productivities.
Home Market Effect. The asymmetric reallocation effect has important implications for the
mass of domestically producing firms. From equation (5) we know that the mass of active
firms in each region is proportional to the labor force times the probability of successful in-
23In contrast to the MCC, the MPC takes an ex ante perspective in that it relates to potential firms’ decisions to
sink setup costs and learn about their productivities.
24This prediction is also present in the single-sector Krugman (1980) model, where the wage rate follows from
equating (6) and (7) and setting β → σ − 1; see Burstein and Vogel (2011) on how Melitz (2003) nests the single-
sector Krugman (1980) model. In the single-sector Krugman (1980) model, however, a HME cannot arise.
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novation. In relative terms, we have MH/MF = χLH/LF . Hence, the larger region hosts
relative more firms than would be consistent with the relative size of the region. We can also
write Home’s share of firms as a function of the relative probability of successful innovation




= γλ, with γ ≡
χ
1 + λ (χ− 1)
. (9)
Clearly, γ increases in χ and falls in λ. Before we proceed, we need a precise definition:
Definition 1 A home market effect exists, if the share of firms located in Home is larger
than Home’s share in the world labor endowment, i.e., if φ > λ.
Our definition of the HME conforms with the literature.25 With λ > 1/2, equation (9) and
Definition 1 imply that
γ > 1 ⇔ χ > 1. (10)
So, a HME exists if and only if the probability of successful innovation is greater in the larger
home region than in Foreign. Figure 1 establishes condition (10) indeed holds. Notice the
crucial role of selection: when selection is inactive, all firms would find it worthwhile to pro-
duce. Then, in both regions we would have pini = 1, and hence χ = 1. It follows that γ = 1 and
the relationship between φ and λ would be one-to-one: there would not be a HME.26
We know from equation (9), that a change in the relative probability of successful inno-
vation χ translates into a change in the share of firms φ. So, a shock on λ has both a “price
effect” and a “quantity effect” (Head and Mayer, 2004). The higher relative wage of Home
shifts the price distribution since it affects unit labor costs. It also affects the share of firms
that do not find it worthwhile to operate (besides the obvious effect of increasing the number
of firms that attempt entry.) In the one-sector Krugman (1980) model, only the price effect
25For prominent examples, see Helpman and Krugman (1985), Hanson and Xiang (2004), or Behrens et al.
(2009). In the standard case with a linear outside sector (without firm-level heterogeneity or with heterogeneity,
but without technology differences), γ is equal to a constant γ̄ and so φ = γ̄λ.The HME materializes if and only if
γ̄ > 1.
26Since γ is not a constant in our setup, one can strengthen the definition of the HME. Therefore, in Section
5.4 we define a strong (or dynamic) HME, as a more than proportionate increase of φ due to an increase in λ, i.e.,
φ′ (λ) > 1.
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exists. Note that the equilibrium relative probability of successful innovation χ is concave in
relative size λ. The reason is that (i) the market potential curve is concave in the relative wage,
(ii) it is not shifted itself by a region size shock, and (iii) the relative wage is strictly increasing
in the share of consumers. We summarize:
Proposition 1 (Home market effect) Consider a two-region single-sector Melitz (2003) model
where productivity is Pareto distributed, 1/2 ≤ λ < λ̄ and B ≥ 1. This model exhibits a HME.
Proof. In the text.





. Also note that Proposition 1 can be strengthened insofar as the HME can
be shown to extend into the region of unconventional sorting; see the extension in Section
5.1. Finally, it can be shown that the existence of a linear outside sector in the Melitz (2003)
model exaggerates the HME relative to the case where the outside sector is absent.27
Real per capita income. The relative probability of successful innovation is the key endoge-
nous determinant of regional real per capita income inequality. Using the domestic cutoff
profit conditions, we can express relative real per capita income as a function of technology












Increasing region size asymmetries and widening the technology gap directly raises relative
real per capita income, but also results in a higher relative probability of successful innova-







. We know from
Figure 1, that χ < λ1−λB
ρ. Because β > σ − 1 and β > ρ, we always have WH > WF . So,
the larger or technologically leading region has the higher real per capita income.28 For the
27To see this, we compare the slopes of φ (λ) at λ = 1/2 across the two modeling frameworks; see Appendix D
for details. With the outside sector, the slope of the locus φ (λ) is equal to 1 + 2η. In the single-sector case, it is
equal to 1 + η/ (2− ρ (1− η) /β). The linear outside sector exaggerates the HME as 1− η < β/ρ.
28This result extends to the case of unconventional sorting; see A.5.3 in the Appendix.
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same reason, it is easy to see that WH/WF increases with λ and B so that a more unequal
distribution of endowments or technology lead to higher inequality.
Proposition 2 (Per capita income) Consider a two-region single-sector Melitz (2003) model
where productivity is Pareto distributed, 1/2 ≤ λ < λ̄ and B ≥ 1.
(a) The larger and technologically leading region exhibits the higher real per capita income.
(b) Larger endowment or technology differences across regions lead to higher regional income
inequality.
Proof. In the text.
3.2 Trade liberalization
In the Helpman-Krugman model with an outside sector and regardless whether firms are ho-
mogeneous or heterogeneous, lower variable trade costs magnify the HME and exacerbate
regional income inequality. These effects are entirely driven by inter-industry reallocations.
In this subsection, we show that in our single-sector model with heterogeneity, higher free-
ness of trade magnifies the HME, but leads to real per capita income convergence.





rises. Conveniently, η only appears in the market potential curve. So,
in Figure 1, the increase of η rotates the MPC upwards, and the new equilibrium features a
higher χ and a lower ω. Intuitively, for a given wage (market potential), higher freeness of
trade favors the larger region as serving the smaller region through exports is now cheaper.
The market crowding locus is not affected since freeness of trade rises symmetrically.29 Hence,
the equilibrium relative probability of successful innovation goes up, which translates into a
larger HME since γ rises in χ for given λ. Moreover, the equilibrium relative wage declines, so
that higher freeness of trade leads to convergence of nominal wages.30 Under conventional
sorting, one can show that γ increases so that the HME becomes stronger.31
29See Section 5.2 on asymmetric trade costs.
30Higher freeness of trade makes it more likely that the conventional sorting conditions fail to hold, so λ̄ falls.
31We provide a generalization of this result to the case of unconventional sorting in Section 5.1.
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While trade liberalization magnifies the HME, it leads to convergence of real income per
capita across regions. Intuitively, higher freeness of trade favors the more open, i.e., the small,
region. Importantly, trade liberalization does not lead to convergence when the model fea-
tures a linear outside sector.32 The reason is that in the presence of an outside sector, the
relative probability of successful innovation depends on the freeness of trade and technol-
ogy differences B, but is independent of the relative size of the regions λ. With B > 1, trade
liberalization reduces the relative probability of successful innovation and therefore leads to
divergence of real per capita income.
Proposition 3 (Trade liberalization) Consider a two-region single-sector Melitz (2003) model
where productivity is Pareto distributed, 1/2 ≤ λ < λ̄ and B ≥ 1.
(a) (Home Market Magnification Effect) Trade liberalization magnifies the home market ef-
fect.
(b) (Per capita income converge) Trade liberalization leads to real per capita income conver-
gence across regions. In the presence of a linear outside sector, there is no convergence if regions
only differ in relative region size and divergence if regions differ in relative productivity.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3 Productivity dispersion
Next, we consider the role of productivity dispersion. Empirical evidence suggests that the
degree of productivity dispersion increases with the level of economic development; see Poschke
(2011). First, for given variable and fixed trade costs, higher dispersion (lower β) raises the
freeness of trade, which only affects the MPC. Second, higher dispersion dampens the effect
of technology differences B. For a given wage rate and freeness of trade, this shifts the MCC
and the MPC upwards. Finally, the effect of a given wage on MCC and MPC is conditioned
on the productivity dispersion. Considering all these effects, higher productivity dispersion
rotates both curves up; see Figure 2. This leads to an increase in the relative probability of
successful innovation χ. A larger χ translates into larger γ so that the HME is magnified when
32See Appendix D for a detailed description of this model.
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the degree of productivity rises.33 The intuition for this result is that higher productivity dis-
persion magnifies differences in domestic entry cutoffs due to size differentials. Dispersion
turns out to favor location in the larger region ex ante and ex post.
The effect of productivity dispersion on the distribution of per capita income is slightly
more involved. Higher productivity dispersion (lower β) raises the relative probability of suc-
cessful innovation and therefore magnifies the HME. At the same time, the elasticity of rel-
ative welfare in the relative probability of successful innovation −1/β increases in absolute
terms, which magnifies the direct effect of χ on relative welfare. Hence, higher productivity
dispersion also leads to convergence.
Complementarity between trade liberalization and productivity dispersion. There is an
interesting interaction between productivity dispersion and trade liberalization. An increase
in productivity dispersion results in an inward rotation of the MPC and outward rotation of
the MCC. Variable trade cost liberalization (lower τ ) magnifies the rotation of the MPC, but
has no additional bearing on the MCC. Hence, the effect of trade liberalization is magnified
33This finding has important implications for empirical studies on the HME, such as Hanson and Xiang (2004).
The present model suggests that one important industry characteristic that shapes the size of the HME is the
degree of productivity dispersion as captured by the shape parameter of the Pareto distribution.
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by a high degree of productivity dispersion. By Young’s Theorem, the effect of higher produc-
tivity dispersion is magnified by lower variable trade costs, too.
Selection. The comparative statics result with respect to productivity dispersion can be
used to analyze the role of selection for income disparities. Burstein and Vogel (2011) show
that the Melitz (2003) model nests the Krugman (1980) model when β reaches its lower bound.
Then, productivity dispersion is maximized. In equilibrium, the mass of firms is concentrated
at very few firms, which are highly productive and are all exporters. So, the selection channel
is effectively shut off. Given that real per capita income converges when β is lowered, income
disparities are larger when selection is active than when selection is inactive.
Proposition 4 (Productivity dispersion) Consider a two-region single-sector Melitz (2003) model
where productivity is Pareto distributed, 1/2 ≤ λ < λ̄ and B ≥ 1.
(a) (Home Market Magnification Effect) Higher productivity dispersion magnifies the home
market effect.
(b) (Per capita income convergence) Higher productivity dispersion lead to real per capita
income convergence across regions. In the presence of a linear outside sector, there is no con-
vergence if regions only differ in relative region size and divergence if regions differ in relative
productivity.
(c) (Complementarity) Higher productivity dispersion magnifies the effect of trade liberaliza-
tion on relative real per capita income and vice versa.
(d) (Selection) Income disparities are larger when selection is active than when selection is in-
active.
Proof. In the Appendix.
3.4 Discussion
The opposite predictions on interregional wage inequality between the single-sector model
and the Krugman-Helpman (1985) model arise from opposite reallocation effects. In the pres-
ence of an outside sector, trade liberalization and higher productivity dispersion lead to a
18
lower probability of successful entry. These effects, however, do not interact with region size,
which implies that magnification then only works through inter-industry reallocation. They
do, however, interact with technology differences. Then, lower trade costs and higher disper-
sion lead to reversed intra-industry reallocation effects, which, inter alia, dampens the HME.
Intra-industry reallocations are an important driver of real per capita income. In the
single-sector model, trade liberalization and higher dispersion lead to stronger reallocation
in the smaller, more open region, and therefore induce convergence. In the model with a
linear outside sector with technology differences, trade liberalization and higher dispersion
lead to stronger reallocation in the technologically leading country, which therefore induces
divergence.
4 Quantitative illustration
In this section, we quantify the importance of the distribution of endowments for the HME
and for interregional inequality. We study the roles of trade costs and productivity dispersion.
Moreover, we illustrate the quantitative relevance of wage adjustment.
The parametrization of the model for our simple numerical analysis is very standard and
follows the literature; see Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007) for a leading example. Our
model is too stylized to realistically capture any two real-world regions; moreover, it is hard
to obtain comparable statistics to match. For this reason, we chose parameters such that the
symmetric version of the model replicates (i) the observed standard deviation of domestic
US plant sales of 0.84, (ii) the export participation rate of US firms of 21% (Bernard et al.,
2004), and (iii) an openness measure (exports over GDP) of 27%.34 Amongst other things, this
implies setting τ = 1.3 and β = 3.3. One important issue relates to the weight of the outside
good in the two-sector model. In line with the working paper version of Demidova (2008), we
set the share of income spent on differentiated goods µ = 0.5. Note that this choice has no
bearing on the strength of the HME, but potentially affects welfare considerations.
34This calibration strategy implies that in the baseline equilibrium λ = 1/2 and B = 1. Details of the calibra-
tion are explained in Appendix B.
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First, we examine the relative roles of interregional differences in endowments and tech-
nology in generating per capita income inequality. For that purpose we allow for B 6= 1. For
the benchmark specification, Figure 3 shows combinations of relative region size λ and rela-
tive productivity bound B which yield the same relative per capita income. A higher relative
per capita income implies that the locus is farther away from the origin. We present curves
for relative per capita income of 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5. For a symmetric endowment distribution
(λ = 1/2), those relative welfare outcomes are achieved by technology levels of 1.32, 1.43, and
1.54, respectively. The link between relative technology and relative welfare is almost but not
exactly one-to-one as B affects WH/WF non-linearly. The same relative positions are sup-
ported for symmetric technology (B = 1) if endowment shares vary between 0.76 and 0.87.
Hence, relative minor endowment share variation can have substantial implications for re-
gional inequality. In the following, we focus on the role of endowment differences (B = 1).
Figure 3: Iso relative per capita income curves
WH WF = 1.5
WH WF = 1.3
WH WF = 1.4







Notes: Regions differ in endowments and technology, but are otherwise
identical with τ = 1.3, β = 3.3, σ = 3.8, and fx/fd = 1.8 (Bernard,
Redding and Schott, 2007). The curves represent combinations of λ
and B which yield the same relative per capita income.
Figure 4 quantitatively illustrates the HME. Gray lines represent the benchmark scenario
(τ = 1.3, β = 3.3). Dashed curves relate to the model with the linear outside sector; the solid
ones to the single-sector case. It is obvious that the presence of the outside sector exaggerates
the HME. At λ = 0.66, Home has 72% of all firms when wages are allowed to adjust, but 78%
when they cannot. Clearly, the gap increases further as λ rises. Note that the sorting pattern
reverses at λ̄ = 0.88. Trade liberalization is modeled by setting τ = 1. Unconventional sorting
obtains for λ > λ̄ = 0.68. Within the range of conventional sorting (and diversification in
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the two-sector case), Figure 4 illustrates the home market magnification effect. It is stronger
when wages are not allowed to adjust. In panel (b), we increase productivity dispersion by
setting β = 2.9. Again, the magnification effect is visible, and it turns out stronger in the
absence of wage adjustment.
Figure 4: Home Market Magnification Effects
(a) Lower trade costs (b) Higher productivity dispersion


















Notes: Gray lines represent the benchmark scenario with τ = 1.3, β = 3.3, σ = 3.8, and fx/fd = 1.8. Dashed
lines relate to model with a linear outside sector. Lower trade costs (bold line) are modeled as τ = 1. Higher
productivity dispersion (bold line) is modeled as β = 2.9. Note that, with a linear outside sector (and B = 1),
β and τ have no effect on regional inequality.
Figure 5 turns to regional inequality as a function of the distribution of the labor endow-
ment and studies how trade costs and firm level heterogeneity shift this function.35 Again, the
dotted line represents the case with a linear outside sector. Also note that we keep B = 1. So,
according to Propositions 3 and 4, the presence of a linear outside sector impedes all conver-
gence (or divergence). This prediction does not depend on the (arbitrary) choice of µ = 0.5.
Figure 5 illustrates that complete abolishment of variable trade cost (τ = 1, panel (a)) and
higher productivity dispersion (β = 2.9, panel (b)), lead to convergence of real per capita
incomes as theWH/WF schedule shifts down from the (gray) baseline locus to the bold func-
tion. The quantitative importance of convergence is substantial: at λ = 0.66, the gap between
H and F falls from 17% to 5%. Importantly, in the Melitz (2003) model, a more pronounced
HME does not imply wider interregional inequality. Although Home hosts more firms, its
relative wage falls and so does relative welfare. The reason is a deterioration in average pro-
ductivity. Without firm-level heterogeneity or with wage insensitivity, such a thing could not




Figure 5: Regional inequality
(a) Lower trade costs (b) Higher productivity dispersion


























Notes: Gray lines represent the benchmark scenario with τ = 1.3, β = 3.3, σ = 3.8, and fx/fd = 1.8. Dashed
lines relate to model with a linear outside sector. Lower trade costs are modeled as τ = 1. Higher productivity
dispersion is modeled as β = 2.9.
Table 1 illustrates the complementarity between trade liberalization and productivity dis-
persion. For a given endowment distribution (λ = 2/3), we report the effect of a reduction
in variable trade costs on relative per capita income for different degrees of productivity dis-
persion. With the benchmark dispersion, inequality falls by 13.7% if variable trade costs drop
from 1.6 to 1.0. With a higher productivity dispersion, this reduction amounts to 15.4%.
Table 1: Relative per capita income
Productivity Variable trade costs
dispersion 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Benchmark 1.06 1.11 1.15 1.17 1.20 1.21 1.22
Higher 1.01 1.06 1.10 1.14 1.16 1.18 1.20
Notes: Variable trade costs τ are denoted in their ad valorem equivalent.
Relative region size is λ = 2/3. Productivity dispersion is inversely related
to β. In the benchmark specification, β = 3.3; higher dispersion refers to
β = 2.9. Moreover, σ = 3.8 and fx/fd = 1.8.
5 Extensions and Additional Results
In the following, we show four further results. First, we prove that a HME generally exists for
all distributions of labor endowment across regions, i.e., also, when the conventional sorting
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assumption is violated. Second, we analyze the effects of unilateral trade cost reductions
on regional inequality and the HME. Third, to better relate our work to empirical studies, we
show that the economy with the larger share of world demand has an overproportionate share
of firms if the underlying demand difference is due to different endowments, but not if it is
due to technological differences. Finally, we work with an alternative, stronger definition of
the HME. In separate Appendices, we show that the Pareto assumption is not crucial for our
results (Appendix C) and that fixed market access costs are necessary for the single-sector
HME to arise (Appendix E).
5.1 Unconventional Sorting
If λ < λ̄, i.e., the distribution of labor endowments is not too asymmetric, “conventional
sorting” obtains and only the most productive firms engage in exporting.36 However, when
regions are asymmetric in size, the sorting pattern can reverse in the smaller region. Less pro-
ductive firms would make negative profits on their small domestic market, for which fixed
costs are high relative to revenue, while they can make profits on the large export market,
where fixed costs are lower relative to revenue. When the sorting pattern reverses, Figure
1 continues to characterize the equilibrium. So, our results on the HME and income con-
vergence continue to hold. The meaning of χ changes, though, since pinF is now given by
1−G [ϕ∗FH ].







Clearly, the MCC is strictly decreasing in ω. In contrast to the case of conventional sorting, it










36See Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Schott (2007) for empirical support for this pattern.
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The MPC is strictly increasing in ω, and now depends on λ and on trade costs. Similar to
the case of conventional sorting, equilibrium can be determined by the intersection of the
two curves. Evaluated at ω = 1, the MPC curve yields χ > 1. Hence, when λ > 1/2 and/or
B > 1, the HME also occurs under unconventional sorting. We summarize these results in
the following proposition:
Proposition 5 (Unconventional sorting). Consider a two-region single-sector Melitz (2003)
model with λ > λ̄.
(a) (Home Market Effect) The larger and technologically leading region has a higher relative
wage (ω) and higher relative probability of successful innovation (χ), so that a home market
effect exists.
(b) (“Magnification”) Higher freeness of trade (η) or higher asymmetries in region size (λ) re-
duce χ, so that the home market effect is diminished.
(c) (Per capita income convergence) Trade liberalization leads to real per capita income con-
vergence across regions.
Proof. In the Appendix.
As a corollary, the model features a HME over all possible interregional allocations of the
labor endowment. As in Crozet and Trionfetti (2008) the HME is non-linear. Their numerical
exercise suggests that the HME is concave in λ for values of λ around the symmetric equi-
librium and convex thereafter. In our setup, the HME is concave for λ < λ̄ and convex for
λ > λ̄.
5.2 Asymmetric trade liberalization
So far, we have studied the effect of symmetric iceberg trade costs on the size of the home
market effect and on regional real income disparities. Now, we focus on asymmetries in vari-
able iceberg trade costs; τFH ≥ 1 measures Home’s import barrier which is equivalent to
Foreign’s export barrier.
As usual, we derive the market crowding curve (MCC) by combining the relative zero cut-
off profit conditions; for simplicity and without loss of generality, we set B = 1. The only
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difference to the analysis in earlier sections is that trade costs no longer drop out from the











a detailed derivation is in Appendix A.6. The MCC is still downward-sloping in the relative
wage ω, but it is shifted by asymmetric changes in trade costs. The market potential curve
(MPC) is also very similar to the one derived earlier with the difference that the freeness of















The slope of this locus is still positive in ω and it possesses an asymptote. For similar reasons
than those discussed above, a HME arises even if τFH 6= τHF ≥ 1.
Unilateral liberalization of the large country’s import barriers, τFH , holding fixed the wage,
raises the export profits of the average firm in the small region. In order to restore zero ex-
pected profits, the probability of successful innovation has to go down, which implies a shift
of the domestic entry cutoff to the right. Hence, similar to Melitz (2003), we have reallocation
from less to more productive firms in the small region. This reallocation effect is reflected
by an upward shift of the MPC. There is, however, a countervailing effect. By balanced trade,
the lower export cutoff of the small region translates into a lower export cutoff in the large
region.37 In order to restore balance, the competitiveness of the small region has to go down.
This adjustment is represented by an upward shift of the MCC. It follows from the diagram
that, with lower τFH , the relative wage falls. However, the effect on the relative probability
of successful innovation χ (and, hence, relative per capita income) is unclear a priori and re-
quires more algebra. In the Appendix, we show that the reallocation effect always dominates
the anti-competitiveness effect, so that a higher χ materializes.38
37Notice that we hold the wage rate fixed.
38In a companion paper (Felbermayr and Jung, 2012), we generalize the insight of Demidova and Rodríguez-
Clare (2011) who have demonstrated welfare gains from unilateral liberalization in a small economy Melitz model.
In a setting with two large regions, we show that unilateral trade liberalization in the form of lower iceberg trade
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Unilateral liberalization of the small region’s import barriers induces reallocation and
anti-competitiveness effects in the large region. Again, the reallocation effect dominates,
which leads to a lower χ and real per capita income divergence.39 The results are summa-
rized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 (Unilateral Trade Liberalization). Consider a two-region single-sector Melitz
(2003) model with λ > λ̄. A unilateral reduction of import barriers by the large region (Home)
(a) (Home Market Magnification Effect) magnifies the HME and
(b) (Per capita income convergence) leads to convergence of real per capita incomes.
Opposite results obtain if the small region liberalizes.
Proof. In the Appendix.
5.3 The HME in demand shares
Empirical work typically analyzes how shocks on demand shares affect production patterns
on the industry level.40 Home’s share in world demand (GDP) is given by
δ ≡ (1 + (1− λ) / (ωλ))−1 ,
which is of course endogenous to the model. In the standard setup, with an identically pa-
rameterized linear outside sector in both regions, we would have ω = 1 and therefore δ = λ.
The HME in demand shares is then identical to the HME in endowment shares. In our case,
this is different since ω > 1. The relative wage can be affected through exogenous changes in
relative size of regions and in relative productivity.
We define the home market effect in demand shares as an overproportional relationship
between the share of firms and the demand share, so that δ > 1/2 ⇒ φ > δ. From equation
costs increases welfare in both regions. In Felbermayr and Jung (2012) we do not analyze relative per capita
income.
39With symmetric trade liberalization, the competitiveness effects exactly cancel out, while trade-induced re-
allocation is stronger in the small region, which is more open.
40We do not extend our model to a multi-industry setup as Hanson and Xiang (2004). Under the assump-
tion of industry-specific labor, this would be straight-forward. Allowing for inter-industry mobility of labor is an
interesting avenue for further research.
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(9), it is easy to see that the HME in demand shares requiresχ > ω. Note that the condition for
a HME in demand shares is stronger than the one for a HME in labor shares, which is χ > 1.
When regions are symmetric in technologies but differ in size, one can show that a HME
arises if and only if η > ρ/ (2β + ρ) , which is the same condition as required for convexity
of the MPC. When regions are identical in size but differ in technologies, however, the nec-
essary condition for a HME can never hold. Hence, there exists a reverse HME: the richer
region hosts an underproportional share of firms. This is due to the fact that higher average
productivity translates into larger average firm size so that the number of firms has to ad-
just downwards. Widening the technology gap (as modeled by an increase in bH) therefore
leads to lower prices, but also reduces the number of domestically produced varieties that
are available without trade costs.
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 (Home market effect in demand shares). Let δ be Home’s share in GDP. Assume




and that the freeness of trade is not too low (η > 1/3).
(a) Let λ > 1/2 and B = 1. Then, the larger region exhibits a HME in demand shares (φ > δ).
(b) Let λ = 1/2 and B > 1. Then, the richer region exhibits a reverse HME in demand shares
(φ < δ).
Proof. In the Appendix.
If regions simultaneously differ in size and technologies, the situation is more compli-
cated. A HME obtains if the relative size of regions is large enough relative to B. The finding
that the underlying cause for interregional variation in demand shares matters for whether
or not a HME exists, is important for empirical work. If a researcher runs a regression of φ on
δ, it is important to control for some measure of b, for example average TFP. Failing to do so
could explain why the empirical literature has found mixed support for the HME so far.
5.4 The strong (or dynamic) HME
Since with intra-firm reallocation effects, γ in equation (9) is not a constant, we can define
the HME in a stronger than standard fashion as follows:
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Definition 2 A strong (dynamic) home market effect exists, if an increase in Home’s labor
share yields a more than proportionate increase in Home’s share of firms, i.e., if φ′ (λ) > 1.
The strong HME is slightly more involved to analyze than the conventional one (φ > λ).
It obtains when an increase in the labor share of a region leads to a more-than-proportionate
increase in its share of firms. Denote by ǫx the elasticity of some variable x with respect to λ.
Then,
ǫφ = 1 + ǫγ > 1 ⇔ ǫγ > 0. (16)
To verify the validity of the above condition, one needs to understand how γ, and hence χ, de-
pend on λ. This can be easily seen with the help of Figure 1, where the effect of an increase in
Home’s share of labor affects only the market crowding curve. It shifts upwards if λ increases;
the shift is larger, the smaller λ is initially. Clearly, an increase in λ leads to a higher relative
wage ω and to a higher relative probability of successful innovation.
So, as long as the conventional sorting condition holds, dχ/dλ > 0 and d2χ/dλ2 < 0.
Equation (9) implies that around the symmetric equilibrium (λ = 1/2, χ = 1) , the derivative
of γ with respect to λ is given by (dχ/dλ) /2.41 It follows that, around the symmetric equilib-
rium, ǫγ is positive and a strong HME exists. As λ grows away from symmetry, the positive
increments to χ become smaller; moreover, a higher λ also has a direct negative effect on γ.
It follows that ǫγ > 0 cannot hold for all λ. Let λ̄ denote the endowment share at which con-
ventional sorting does no longer hold. It can be proved that the strong HME exists over an
interval (1/2, λ∗) with the critical value λ∗ bounded by λ∗ < λ̄.
Proposition 8 (Strong HME). Consider a two-region single-sector Melitz (2003) model where
productivity is Pareto distributed, 1/2 ≤ λ < λ̄ and B ≥ 1. This model exhibits a strong HME
if λ < λ∗, where λ∗ ≤ λ̄.
Proof. In the Appendix.
41For a general characterization, see Appendix A.8.
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6 Conclusion
This paper provides a tractable way to characterize a two-region single-sector asymmetric
Melitz (2003) model for the purpose of conducting comparative statics. It does so without
imposing a linear, perfectly competitive and frictionless outside sector, as the literature has
usually chosen to do. The outside sector assumption has been criticized to be unrealistic and
possibly important for aggregate results, such as welfare (Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare,
2011), or for the ability of the model to predict a Home Market Effect (HME), by which a large
region attracts a more than proportionate share of producing firms (Davis, 1998).
We show that firm-level productivity heterogeneity and selection effects interact to gener-
ate a HME even in the absence of inter-sectoral reallocation. Hence, the existence of a HME is
a more robust characteristic of increasing-returns-to-scale Krugman (1980) type trade mod-
els than previously thought. The HME is non-linear, as the empirical analysis of Crozet and
Trionfetti (2008) suggests. It is magnified by falling trade costs and by a higher degree of firm-
level productivity dispersion. The HME translates into interregional per capita welfare dif-
ferences. In contrast to the model with a linear outside sector, trade liberalization attenuates
these interregional differences and leads to real wage convergence. Firm-level heterogeneity
is absolutely crucial for these results: in the Krugman (1980) single-sector model, no HME
can arise. Moreover, convergence is stronger when the degree of firm-level heterogeneity is
more pronounced. Lower trade costs and more pronounced firm-size dispersion make inter-
regional disparities based on market size and technology differences less pronounced.
While our analysis sheds new light on the role of trade costs and firm-level productivity
dispersion for interregional economic disparities, it also has a number of empirical impli-
cations. While the assumption of a linear outside sector does not stand up against empirical
evidence, firm level heterogeneity is well-documented. Since the outside-sector is not crucial
for the existence of a HME, an empirical rejection of an overproportionate relation between
a region’s share of firms and its share of endowments is indeed evidence against increasing
returns theories of international (or interregional) trade. Moreover, empirical tests that fail to
control for the level of technology may wrongly reject the existence of an endowment-driven
HME. Finally, tests should also control for industry productivity dispersion.
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A Proofs of Lemmata and Propositions, Details to Derivations
A.1 Derivation of equilibrium conditions
Zero cutoff profit conditions. Demand for any variety is given by




where the price index to (1) is given by P 1−σi =
∫
z∈Ωi
p [z]1−σ dz and Ri denotes aggregate
expenditure.42 Given the demand function, the price charged at the factory gate is wi/ (ρϕ).
Then, operating profits of a firm from region i on market j are







/σ − wifij .









































where θ ≡ β/ (β − σ + 1) is a positive constant.
Free entry condition. Using optimal demand and the zero cutoff profit condition, we obtain

















































which reduces to the expression in the text.
42Note that each variety z is produced by a single firm with productivity level ϕ. We henceforth index varieties
by ϕ.
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where the second equality follows from insertingM ei =Mi/p
in
i , using the free entry condition
to substitute out f e, and using the zero cutoff profit conditions to substitute out the cutoff
productivity levels. The formula in the text follows from using the free entry condition to
substitute out
∑
j mijfij and noting that θσ/ (θ − 1) = β/ρ.
Trade balance condition. In analogy to expected profits, we can write expected revenues of








Using this expression, the labor market clearing condition, the definition of mij and exploit-
ing symmetry of fixed cost, we obtain the balanced trade condition (8).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
A.2.1 Derivation of market crowding curve
In order to derive the market crowding curve (MCC), we use the zero cutoff profit conditions
in relative terms and the balanced trade condition. Taking F as the target market and using






























denotes Home’s relative probability of successful innovation.
A.2.2 Derivation of market potential curve
In order to derive the market potential curve (MPC), we use the free entry conditions in rel-
ative form along with the zero cutoff profit conditions and the balanced trade condition.
35






Expanding mij by ϕ
∗

















Using mij in equation (19) along with the zero profit conditions and B = bH/bF , and









A.2.3 Characteristics of market potential and market crowding curves
Market crowding curve. The market crowding curve implies a downward-sloping and con-







where the inequalities follow from 2β > ρ. Evaluated at ω = Bρ, the market crowding curve
takes the value χ = λ1−λB
ρ ≥ 1. χ is bounded from below by 0.
Market potential curve. The MPC features an asymptote at ω = η
− ρ
βBρ. Evaluated at ω =
Bρ, both the numerator and denominator are 1−η > 0, which results inχ = 1. The nominator
is increasing in ω. Hence, for ω ≥ Bρ, the nominator is always positive. The denominator is






. Combining these observations, we can
conclude that the MPC takes positive values on the interval [Bρ, η
− ρ
βBρ).


































The inequality follows from Bβω
−β








ρ − η > 0 ⇔ ω >
Bρη
ρ
β > Bρ, where the last inequality follows from η < 1.
Convexity of the market potential curve requires that the freeness of trade is not too small.
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Moreover, one can show that the term in round brackets is increasing in ω. The derivative of


































is η < 1. More-
over, it is easy to check that the second term is also increasing inω, which completes the proof
of convexity of the MPC curve.
A.2.4 Derivation of conventional sorting cutoff λ̄
Cutoff level λ̄ up to which Foreign first serves domestic and then export market is implicitly

































ρ B−β . (21)
Using this expression to substitute out λ̄
1−λ̄
































This expression can be used to back out λ̄ from equation (21).
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
A.3.1 Home Market Magnification Effect
Evaluated atω = Bρ, the market potential curve takes the valueχ = 1, which does not depend


















where the inequality follows from ω > Bρ. The locus of the market crowding curve is unaf-
fected. Then, χ has to increase, which raises γ and therefore magnifies the HME. The equilib-
rium value of ω declines in response to a freeness of trade shock.
A.3.2 Per capita income convergence











Equation (11) directly follows from rewriting equation (22) in relative terms. It constitutes
a negative relationship between relative real per capita income and freeness of trade. Then,
higher freeness of trade leads to real per capita income convergence.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
A.4.1 Home Market Magnification Effect











for ω > Bρ.



































































lnω ≤ ρ lnB + ρ ln τ +






This inequality follows from taking logs on both sides of ω < η
− ρ
βBρ and using the definition









ρ lnB + ρ ln τ +

















































The inequality follows from the following observations. First, the second term is negative
since Bβω
−β






. The latter inequality follows from the characteristics
of the MPC curve. Second, the term in squared brackets is positive. To see this, notice the
characteristics of the MPC curve imply that:
Bβω
−β







− 2η = −η.
Moreover, the characteristics of the MPC curve imply
1− ηBβω
−β
ρ > 1− ηBβ (Bρ)
−β
ρ = 1− η > 0,
where the last inequality follows from η < 1. Hence, higher dispersion leads to a higher χ,
which raises γ and magnifies the HME.
A.4.2 Per capita income convergence














where the inequality follows from χ > 1 and χ̂
β̂



























where ∂χ/∂τ < 0 and ∂ χ̂
β̂
/∂τ > 0; see Appendix A.3.1.
A.4.4 Selection
The claim follows from noting that selection is effectively shut off if β approaches its lower
bound. The claim follows from the fact that higher dispersion (lower β) leads to convergence.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
Under unconventional sorting, equations (6) and (7) continue to hold. This claim is obvi-
ous for equation (6), which follows from the zero cutoff profit conditions. It is also true for
equation (7) because the free entry condition that prevails in the small region under uncon-























 = f e.
As a consequence, we can still use the graphical tool displayed in Figure 1 to characterize
equilibrium. Notice, however, that we can no longer read the y-axis as the relative proba-
bility of successful innovation. It follows that also under unconventional sorting, the larger
or technologically leading region pays the higher wage. Moreover, higher freeness of trade
unambiguously reduces the relative wage.
A.5.1 Home market effect



























which constitutes our market crowding curve.
Using equation (23) to substitute out ω
β
















which constitutes an upward-sloping relationship between χ and ω. Notice that the MPC






ρ − η = 0 ⇔ ω = Bρη
ρ
β .
Moreover, at ω = Bρη
ρ








where the inequality follows from η < 1. Hence, the equilibrium relative probability of suc-
cessful innovation is larger than fx/fd > 1. Together with equation (9), this proves the exis-
tence of a HME under unconventional sorting.
One can show that ω > 1. Evaluating the MCC curve and the MPC curve at ω = 1, we
obtain χ = f
x
fd
























Rearranging terms, we can rewrite this inequality as
η <
λBβ − (1− λ)B−β
2λ− 1
.
Notice that the right hand side is equal to unity whenB = 1 and larger than one whenB > 1,
while by definition η < 1.
A.5.2 “Magnification”
Lower variable trade costs shift down both the market crowding and the market potential
curves. Lower export fixed costs additionally shift both curves proportionally. Hence, a higher
freeness of trade lowers the relative probability of successful innovation under unconven-
tional sorting, which implies that the home market effect is diminished under unconven-
tional sorting.
A.5.3 Per capita income convergence














This is a general expression which holds under unconventional and conventional sorting.43
Under conventional sorting, the inequality follows from λ ≥ 1/2, B ≥ 1, ω > Bρ, β > (σ − 1) ,
and β > ρ. Given that ω is falling in the freeness of trade, higher freeness of trade leads to
convergence in real per capita income.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 6
A.6.1 Preliminaries
Market crowding curve. Taking F as the target market and using the two associated zero


























































































Endogenous wage adjustment. We borrow the following observations from Felbermayr and
Jung (2012). First, the relative wage and the export cutoff of the larger region are positively
correlated
ω̂ = ξϕ̂∗HF , where β > ξ ≡
βρ
ρ+ αF (β − ρ)
> ρ,
where dx/x = x̂; see their equation (12). αi denotes the share of income spent on domestic
goods. Second, the export cutoffs of both regions are positively correlated
ϕ̂∗HF = βϕ̂
∗
FH/ (β − ξ) ;
43In the case of conventional sorting, it follows from substituting out χ by means of the MCC (6).
42
see their equation (13). Finally, the Foreign’s export cutoff falls if Home lowers its import
barriers τFH













see text below their equation (13).44
Combining these observations, we can quantify the percentage drop in the relative wage





A.6.2 Home Market Magnification Effect
The change in the relative entry probability is given by











Magnification of the HME requires 1 − 2β−ρβ−ξ ξκ < 0. Employing the definition of κ, we can
rewrite this condition as












where the last inequality holds since ξ > ρ and αH < 1. Hence, lowering the larger region’s
import barriers magnifies the HME.
A.6.3 Per capita income convergence
Equation (11) continues to hold under asymmetric trade liberalization and implies that a
magnification of the HME translates into convergence of real per capita income.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
A.7.1 Preliminaries
Home’s share of demand is
δ ≡
1
1 + ω−1 1−λλ
.
Comparing δ to the Home’s share of firms φ in equation (9), we find that a HME in demand
shares requires χ > ω.
44Note that Home’s import barriers τFH are denoted τH in Felbermayr and Jung (2012).
43
A necessary condition for the equilibrium χ to exceed the equilibrium ω is that the MPC
curve lies above the MCC curve at the intersection of the latter with ω = χ. The wage ω̃ for





































where ℓ ≡ λ/ (1− λ) with ℓ ≥ 1.
A.7.2 Region size differences











If ℓ increases, the numerator increases, but the denominator increases faster, such that the













































Second, consider B > 1 and ℓ = 1. Then, the necessary condition for a HME in demand
shares reduces to
η > 1,
which can never hold. Quite the opposite is true. Hence, if regions are symmetric in size
but differ in their average productivity, the richer (technologically leading) region hosts an
underproportional share of firms.
44
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Remember that
φ = γλ, γ =
χ






∂λ [1 + λ (χ− 1)]− χ
(
χ+ λ∂χ∂λ − 1
)







∂λλ [1 + λ (χ− 1)]− λχ
(
χ+ λ∂χ∂λ − 1
)
1 + λ (χ− 1)
1
χ







































The conjecture is that we can identify a downward- and an upward-sloping curve such that




























We prove that the left hand side is downward-sloping in ω and therefore downward-sloping
in λ, whereas the right hand side is increasing in λ.
The ∂χ∂ω
ω





















































































































/∂ω < 0. To check this, de-
fine
























We have to show that
f ′ [ω] g [ω]− f [ω] g′ [ω] < 0,
where





























































The last inequality follows from B2βω
− 2β
ρ < 1 ⇔ ω > Bρ and f [ω] > 0.







































ρ < 1 and B2βω
− 2β
















⇐⇒ 0 < Bβω
−β













locus. Using equation (21), we can define


















































































































































































ρ increases in ω and therefore in λ.
Hence, the downwards-sloping ∂χ∂ω
ω









locus determine a unique λ∗ such that for λ < λ∗ a strong HME occurs.
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B Calibration
We use standard results from the literature to calibrate the model at symmetric equilibrium.45
An important source of information is Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003).They argue
that σ = 3.8 fits their data well and report that the standard deviation of domestic US plant
sales is 0.84. In terms of the Melitz (2003) model, this value has to equal (σ − 1) /β. With the
estimate for σ at hand, we obtain β = 3.3, which meets the restriction β > σ − 1. Moreover,
it is close to estimates from other sources.46 According to Bernard et al. (2003), the export
participation rate of US firms is about 21%.47 Using τ = 1.3, which we take from Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2001), and the corresponding values for σ and β, the implied relative export fixed







Under this parameter constellation, the freeness of trade is given by η ≈ 0.38. The implied
conventional sorting amounts to λ̄ ≈ 0.88. Since it is only implicitly defined, we have to back
out λ∗ from our simulations. The market potential curve is convex, and a HME in demand
shares arises.
45We follow Demidova (2008).
46Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) report that the shape parameters for total manufacturing are 3.03 and 2.55 for
Italy and France, respectively.
47In Europe, the UK features a similar export participation rate (28%), but German and French export partici-





Home Market Effect, Regional Inequality, and
Intra-Industry Reallocations
April 4, 2012
C The HME with a General Sampling Distribution
In this subsection, we generalize the argument to a situation where firms’ productivity levels
are sampled from a general productivity distribution. Our MCC and MPC curves hinge on the
assumption of the Pareto distribution and are therefore of no help in the general case. While
it is difficult to derive results on the strong HME or on magnification effects, it is possible to
establish the HME for the case of conventional sorting.
To this end, it appears useful to reduce the equilibrium conditions (2) - (5) to two equa-
tions in ω and Home’s export cutoff ϕ∗HF , which have opposite slopes. The two loci are sub-
stantially more complicated than our MCC and MPC schedules, but they are still useful for
our purposes. Labor endowment shares affect only one of these curves, which allows infer-
ence on the effect of a region size shock on the relative wage and the various cutoffs. More-
over, drawing on a generalized labor market clearing condition, we can derive our result on
the home market effect.
Lemma 2’ Assume that productivity levels are sampled from a general productivity distribu-
tion. Then, the larger region pays the higher wage.
Proof. As proposed by Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2011), we reduce the model’s equilib-
rium conditions (2), (4), and (5) to a system of two equations in ω and ϕ∗HF . The first curve
draws on zero cutoff profit and free entry conditions and is independent of the productivity










Foreign’s domestic entry cutoff ϕ∗FF is a function of its export cutoff ϕ
∗
FH by free entry. More-
over, using the relative cutoff profit conditions for entry into Home, ϕ∗FH can be expressed as
a function of the relative ω and ϕ∗HH . The latter is a function of ϕ
∗
HF by free entry. Hence, our
first equilibrium condition constitutes an upward sloping and concave relationship between
the relative wage and Home’s export cutoff. It is important to note that the locus of this curve
is not affected by region size.
Under a general productivity distribution, the balanced trade condition can be rewritten as
σ (ϕ∗HH)
























The left hand side of equation (25) is independent of ω. Moreover, it rises in ϕ∗HF . The right
hand side can be expressed as a function of ϕ∗FH . ϕ
∗
FH has to rise in ϕ
∗
HF . By free entry, ϕ
∗
HH










Since ϕ∗FH rises and ϕ
∗
HH falls, ω must fall to restore equilibrium. Hence, trade balance estab-
1
lishes a negative relationship between Home’s export cutoff and the relative wage.
Consider a region size shock. For a given relative wage, the right hand side of the trade bal-
ance curve must be larger, which can only come about by an increase inϕ∗HF . Hence, a region
size shock shifts the trade balance locus upwards. We also conclude that the larger region
pays a higher wage, which extends Lemma 1 to the general case.
Proposition 1’ Assume that productivity levels are sampled from a general productivity dis-
tribution. Moreover, assume that conventional sorting holds (1/2 < λ < λ̄). Then, the model
exhibits a HME.






f e/pinF + f
d + fxmFH
f e/pinH + f
d + fxmHF
. (27)
We have argued in the proof of Lemma 1’ that a region size shock raises Home’s export cutoff
ϕ∗HF . By free entry, Home’s domestic entry cutoff falls. Hence, the denominator of the above
expression falls. It follows from equation (26) that Foreign’s export cutoff ϕ∗FH falls since ϕ
∗
HH
falls and ω rises. By free entry, ϕ∗FF rises. Then, the numerator of the above equation rises,
which implies that the effect of the region size shock on the relative mass of firms is magni-
fied.
It is easy to check that MH/MF = φ/ (1− φ) > λ/ (1− λ) directly translates into φ > λ, which
constitutes a home market effect.
2
D Melitz (2003) with outside sector
In this appendix, we derive equilibrium in the presence of an outside sector. We show that
the economy exhibits a home market effect. As in Helpman and Krugman (1995), the home
market effect is linear in λ. Moreover, we discuss welfare implications.
Basic environment. The model is augmented by a homogeneous good produced under
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Utility takes the Cobb-Douglas form,
where µ denotes the share of expenditure spent on differentiated varieties. The outside good
is freely tradable. Hence, wages are equalized and henceforth normalized to unity. Welfare
per worker is given by the inverse of the aggregate price index. Using Pi to denote the price





Equilibrium. The free entry conditions are unaffected. In the zero cutoff profit conditions,








Hence, we can substitute out export cutoffs from the free entry conditions. We obtain two
equations in two unknowns, which can be used to solve for the domestic entry cutoffs as
(ϕ∗ii)











It is important to note that the cutoff productivity levels do not depend on region size. With
symmetric technology bH = bF = b, they reduce to
(ϕ∗ii)
β = (θ − 1)
fd
f e
(1 + η) bβ .
The free entry conditions along with the relative zero cutoff profit conditions allow to solve





where the equality appears for B = 1. Notice that χ does not depend on relative region size.






















where ξi denotes the fraction of workers employed in the differentiated good sector.
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] = θσmijfij .
Assuming bH = bF , cutoffs are symmetric. We henceforth suppress the subscripts of the
revenue terms. Note that r̄x/r̄d reduces to η.
Balanced trade is given by
Mir̄ij =Mj r̄ji + (1− µ)Li − (1− ξi)Li,
where the term on the left hand side represents region i’s exports of the differentiated good.
The first term on the right hand side represents i’s imports of the differentiated good. The re-
maining terms reflect i’s imports of the homogeneous good (spending on the homogeneous
good minus value of domestic homogeneous good production).











ξj , i ∈ {H,F} .










, i ∈ {H,F} .
Using the above expressions, we find that
ξH > ξF ⇔
1 + ηLHLF B
β
1 + η LFLHB
−β
> 1 > χ,
where the first inequality follows from λ ≥ 1/2 and B ≥ 1. Hence, the smaller region is the
net exporter of the homogeneous good.
Home market effect. The labor market clearing conditions implies that Home’s share of
firms active in the differentiated good sector can be written as
φ =
1




Using r̄HH = r̄FF = r̄














r̄d + r̄HF + r̄FH
)
− r̄FH







r̄d + r̄HF + r̄FH
)
(χ−1r̄d + (χ−1 − 1) [λ (r̄d + r̄HF + r̄FH)− r̄FH ])
2 .




= 1 + 2
r̄x
r̄d
= 1 + 2η.
Comparison to single-sector model. It is easy to check that ∂φ/∂λ = γ + λ∂γ/∂λ, where
the first term is the direct effect of a region size shock on λ. The second term represents the
indirect effect due to adjustments in the relative probability of successful innovation. We
















































At the symmetric equilibrium, the slope of the φ-curve is given by
∂φ
∂λ







which is strictly smaller than the slope of φ in λ for the case with the outside sector since
ρ (1− η) /β < 1.






















With B = 1, the relative probability of successful innovation is fixed at unity and neither
5
trade liberalization nor productivity dispersion affect relative per capita income. For B > 1,







Hence, for B > 1, trade liberalization leads to divergence of real per capita income.
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E Melitz (2003) without export selection
In the absence of fixed exporting costs (fx = 0), all firms export as in Krugman (1980). In a
setting with symmetric countries, Melitz (2003) argues that fixed export costs are crucial for
trade to induce "distributional changes among firms" (footnote 24, p. 170). We generalize this
remark to the case of asymmetric countries, which stresses the importance of intra-industry
reallocation for our results.
Zero cutoff profit conditions. We only have to characterize the domestic entry conditions.
As the elasticity of demand is constant across countries, firms charge the same ex-factory
price in all markets, which is a constant mark-up over marginal costs. Given optimal demand
















The entry cutoff ϕ∗i is determined by the zero cutoff profit condition
πi [ϕ
∗
i ] = 0.
Free entry conditions. As in Melitz (2003), free entry requires that the expected profits must
be equal to the innovation fixed costswif


























Using the zero cutoff profit condition, we obtain:
π̄i = (θ − 1)wif
d.
Then, the free entry condition reads:
(θ − 1) pini f
d = f e.
Equilibrium. Recall that pini = (ϕ
∗
i /bi)
−β . Hence, the free entry condition implies that the
equilibrium entry cutoff ϕ∗i is independent of region size and variable trade costs. This, in
turn, means that the mass of firms is fixed, and there is no HME. Trade liberalization has no
effect on real per-capita income.
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